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Abandoning Realization and the Transition
Tax: Toward a Comprehensive Tax Base
HENRY ORDOWER†
INTRODUCTION
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 20171 [hereinafter “TCJA”]
was unusual in at least two respects. First, it was enacted
with one major political party introducing and advancing the
legislation without input from the other major party.2
Second, several of its features overtly favor certain taxpayers
over others.3 The TCJA also imposed a tax, the “transition
tax,” on as much as thirty-one years of undistributed,
accumulated corporate income.4 This article focuses on that
transition tax by evaluating the function and
constitutionality of the tax and considers whether the
transition tax might serve as a model for addressing the
†Professor

of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, A.B. Washington
University, M.A., J.D. The University of Chicago.
1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2018).
2. Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate in
51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/
politics/tax-bill-vote-congress.html.
3. See, e.g., TCJA, § 11011(a), 131 Stat. at 2063 (2017) (amending Title 26 of
the United States Code, adding I.R.C. § 199A (Supp. 2017) providing a twenty
percent deduction of the income of certain individuals engaged in a trade or
business other than as employees).
4. TCJA, § 14103(a), 131 Stat. at 2195 (2017) (amending I.R.C. § 965 to
include the “transition tax,” replacing its existing but obsolete predecessor).
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broader problem of deferred income in the United States. The
article recommends a broad-based, one-time marking to
market of all property, inclusion of the net gain in the
holders’ incomes at a significantly reduced rate of tax,
followed by a transition to an accrual system of taxation
under which growth in the value of taxpayers’ property is
included in income annually. Such a scheme might permit
taxpayers to pay the tax in installments over an extended
period or, in some instances, defer payment of the tax until
disposition of the property. Under such circumstances,
deferral of the unpaid tax could incur an interest charge.
Part I of the Article evaluates the transition tax in the
context of offshore deferral of income in the U.S. worldwide
taxation system. Part II describes the operation of the
transition tax in its departure from tax precedent. Part III
reviews the leading U.S. Supreme Court decision of Eisner v.
Macomber,5 with facts closely resembling the transition tax
facts, and the increasing number of departures from the
realization/income requirement which have become part of
the tax law. Part IV examines the controlled foreign
corporation [hereinafter “CFC”] rules through which the
transition tax operates to ascertain if those rules provide
independent support for departure from the realization
principle. Part V considers first the abandonment of
realization and the current taxation of appreciation and
depreciation in the value of property against the backdrop of
a Haig-Simons comprehensive income tax definition of
income6 and then the relationship between the capital gain

5. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
6. The classic Haig–Simons definition of income is “the algebraic sum of (1)
the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period
in question.” HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF
INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
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tax preference7 and the realization principle.8 Part VI
concludes by proposing adaptation of the transition tax
single incident of taxation as a model for the design of a
broad-based transition tax that would lay the foundation for
accretion taxation of gain and loss from property consistent
with comprehensive tax bases following the Haig-Simons
income model.
I.

THE TRANSITION TAX

The transition tax9 requires the one-time inclusion of
“deferred foreign income”10 in the income of United States
shareholders11 of CFCs12 and other “specified foreign
corporations.”13 The concepts of “deferred income” and
“deferral” with respect to foreign source income refer to the
income from the conduct of a corporate trade or business
outside the U.S. through one or more non-U.S. subsidiary
corporations. Since the U.S. taxes U.S. citizens, residents
and domestic corporations on their income from all sources

7. Net capital gain is taxed at a rate lower than ordinary income, making
long-term capital gain favored gain. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012). See also I.R.C. § 1222(11)
(Supp. 2017) (defining net capital gain as the excess of net long-term capital gain
over net short-term capital loss).
8. See Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments,
35 TAXES 247, 249 (1957) (see discussion infra Part V).
9. I.R.C. § 965.
10. Id.
11. The definition of United States shareholder [hereinafter “U.S.
shareholder”] is a shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation (see infra note
12), who owns ten percent or more of the voting interests and value of said
corporation. I.R.C. § 951(b) (Supp. 2017).
12. The definition of controlled foreign corporation is a corporation having
U.S. shareholders who own more than fifty percent of the voting rights or value
of the corporation’s shares. I.R.C. § 957(a) (Supp. 2017).
13. Specified foreign corporations are foreign corporations having a U.S.
shareholder that is a domestic corporation, even if the foreign corporations are
not CFCs. I.R.C. § 965(e)(1)(B). For a discussion of the new international tax
provisions and elimination of deferral through foreign corporations that is a
function of the realization requirement, see Daniel N. Shaviro, The New NonTerritorial U.S. International Tax System, 160 TAX NOTES 57 (2018).
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worldwide,14 the foreign source income of a domestic
corporation is subject to current U.S. taxation. With limited
exceptions,15 the foreign source income of a foreign
corporation,16 whether or not owned by U.S. persons, is not
subject to the U.S. income tax.17 Use of the term “deferral”
contemplates that the U.S. parent corporation could have
conducted the corporate trade or business outside the U.S.
and earned the foreign income itself, but chose not to do so
and remains the ultimate, indirect owner of the income
through its share ownership in the foreign corporation.18 In

14. I.R.C. § 61 (Supp. 2017) (defining gross income as “all income from
whatever source derived”). In addition, Part III of subchapter B of the I.R.C.
expressly excludes certain items from gross income. See the participation
exemption found in I.R.C. § 245A (Supp. 2017) (excluding dividends by means of
a dividends received deduction out of the foreign source income of foreign
corporations from the income of their domestic corporate owners owning ten
percent or more of the foreign corporation). See also CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON,
ROBERT J. PERONI, AND RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 169 (1997).
15. Foreign source income of a foreign corporation that is effectively
connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business is taxable in the U.S. under
the worldwide taxation principle as the U.S. trade or business is taxable on its
worldwide income. I.R.C. § 882(a) (Supp. 2017). Subpart F income, as defined in
I.R.C. § 952 (Supp. 2017), is includable in the gross income of the U.S.
shareholders of a CFC on a limited pass-through basis under I.R.C. § 951. See
discussion infra note 120 and accompanying text.
16. Certain U.S. source income of a foreign corporation is taxable through a
withholding tax in the U.S. under I.R.C. § 881 (2012), and both U.S. source and
foreign source income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S.
trade or business is taxable. I.R.C. § 882(a) (referring to effectively connected
income).
17. Shaviro, supra note 13, at 70 (discussing the history of deferral).
Similarly, U.S. parent corporations are not taxable on the income of their U.S.
subsidiaries because they are separate taxable entities. The parent and its
subsidiaries may combine their incomes by consenting to file a consolidated
income tax return. I.R.C. § 1501 (2012).
18. Some seek to give the use of the term “deferred” in the statute greater
definitional significance by distinguishing deferred from excluded income. Hank
Adler & Lacy Williams, The Worst Statutory Precedent in Over 100 Years, 160
TAX NOTES 1415–17 (2018). This article views use of deferred and deferral as
simply the adoption by Congress of the term customarily used for offshore
corporate profits.
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the case of working control of the subsidiary,19 the control
would enable the U.S. corporation to cause the foreign
corporation to distribute the foreign source income earned by
the foreign corporation to the domestic corporation and
possibly other shareholders. In the case of other specified
foreign corporations,20 which are not CFCs and over which
U.S. shareholders do not have working control, the power to
cause the foreign corporation to distribute the income may
be absent, leaving the shareholder with transition tax
liability and no source of funds with which to pay the tax.
Unless a corporation and its shareholders make certain
elections,21 corporate income is taxable only to the corporate
entity, and not to its shareholders, until the corporation
distributes the income to its shareholders. Distributions
need not be actual distributions directly to the shareholders
but may be constructive as well. Constructive distributions
constitute dividends and include payments to third parties
that benefit a shareholder, payments to persons related to a
shareholder,22
and
payments
to
shareholders
mischaracterized as payments for services because they
exceed reasonable amounts of compensation.23 The excess
compensation amount is reclassified as a non-deductible
dividend rather than tax deductible compensation.24

19. Here the term “control” is used to refer to the voting power to direct
distribution from the corporation as opposed to the tax definition of control under
the CFC or other corporate tax rules.
20. Shaviro, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
21. See I.R.C. § 1362 (Supp. 2017) (permitting election to be an S corporation
with corporate income taxable to the corporation’s shareholders); I.R.C. § 1501
(permitting consolidated returns with consent of all affiliated corporations in
group).
22. Arnes v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522, 530 (1994) (concluding that
redemption of shares from divorced spouse is a constructive dividend to husband
who continued to own the corporation).
23. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (Supp. 2017) (allowing a deduction for compensation
only to the extent the compensation is reasonable).
24. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REASONABLE COMPENSATION
JOB AID FOR IRS VALUATION PROFESSIONALS (2014) https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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Shareholders of regulated investment companies may
consent to reinvest their dividends without receiving the
dividends in cash with the constructive distributions that are
reinvested being classified as ordinary income and long term
capital gain on a limited pass-through method under which
the corporation is itself not taxable on the income.25
Similarly, shareholders of passive foreign investment
companies [hereinafter “PFIC”] may make qualified electing
fund elections and include their shares of a foreign
corporation’s income and long-term capital gain annually.26
The PFIC itself is taxable in the U.S. on its U.S. source
income, if any, and may be taxable in other jurisdictions on
its income earned there. Only in the case of U.S.
shareholders of CFCs are shareholders of a corporation
taxable on some corporate income in the absence of a
distribution or an election to become taxable without a
distribution.27
Historically, the foreign source income, other than its
subpart F income,28 of a foreign subsidiary became subject to
U.S. tax only when it was “repatriated.” Repatriation refers
to the distribution by the foreign corporation of all or part of
its accumulated income to its U.S. owners as a dividend,
possibly when those U.S. owners vote their shares to require
the distribution. The term applied to such distributions,
“repatriation,” like the term “deferral,” rhetorically views the
utl/Reasonable%20Compensation%20Job%20Aid%20for%20IRS%20Valuation%
20Professionals.pdf.
25. I.R.C. § 852 (Supp. 2017).
26. I.R.C. § 1293 (Supp. 2017).
27. See I.R.C. § 551 (2000), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 413, 118 Stat. 1418, 1506 (imputing dividends from foreign
personal holding companies and taxing them currently to their owners in the
U.S.). Repeal served a tax simplification purpose to eliminate overlapping antideferral regimes. H.R. Rep. No. 108-548(I), at 127. See also Henry Ordower, The
Expatriation Tax, Deferrals, Mark to Market, The Macomber Conundrum and
Doubtful Constitutionality, 15 Pitt. Tax Rev. 1, 18 (2017) (arguing that the foreign
personal holding company inclusion probably was unconstitutional).
28. I.R.C. § 952 (Supp. 2017) (defining subpart F income). See generally
discussion of subpart F and CFC infra text accompanying note 127.
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income as belonging to the U.S. parent corporation owner
even if earned and held by the foreign corporation.
II. OPERATION OF THE TRANSITION TAX
The transition tax29 departs from the longstanding tax
principle that corporate income is taxable to the
corporation’s shareholders only when distributed to them.
Previously,
Congress
encouraged
repatriation
of
accumulated foreign income by temporarily reducing the rate
of tax for repatriations with an 85 percent dividends received
deduction for certain cash distributions from CFCs to their
corporate U.S. shareholders.30 Formerly, Internal Revenue
Code Section 965 required an actual distribution, without
which the U.S. shareholders would have had no inclusion in
income. Now, Section 965 requires neither actual nor
constructive distribution31 from the foreign corporation, as it
includes the foreign corporation’s accumulated foreign
source earnings and profits32 in the foreign corporation’s
subpart F income for the corporation’s taxable year
beginning in 2017.33 The subpart F income in turn is
includable pro rata in its U.S. shareholders’ incomes under

29. I.R.C. § 965 (Supp. 2017).
30. I.R.C. § 965 (2004). The 2004 statute was effective for only a single tax
year under the I.R.C. § 965(f) election.
31. Both actual and constructive distributions are includable under I.R.C.
§ 301 to the extent of the distributing corporation’s current and accumulated
earnings and profits. There is a constructive distribution when the recipient could
have taken an actual distribution but elected not to do so. Constructive
distributions are common in mutual funds when account holders check the box
for an election to reinvest dividends.
32. I.R.C. § 965 uses the term “post-1986 deferred foreign income” rather than
accumulated earnings and profits in order to exclude amounts that would not
have generated taxable dividends if distributed by foreign corporation to its U.S.
shareholders because the amounts either already were taxed under the CFC
rules to the US shareholders and or were taxed in the U.S. as income effectively
connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.
33. I.R.C. § 965(a) (explaining that if the foreign corporation has more than
one year beginning in 2017, the applicable year is the last of those years).
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the CFC rules.34 In addition, the inclusion under the
transition tax also applies to U.S. shareholders of foreign
corporations that are not CFCs if they have at least one
corporate U.S. shareholder.35
The portion of the subpart F income includable under the
transition tax is accompanied by a deduction that has the
effect of reducing the rate of the transition tax to fifteen-anda-half percent of the foreign corporations’ assets, consisting
of cash and cash equivalent positions, and eight percent on
the remaining amount included under the transition tax.36
The higher rate of tax on cash equivalents than on operating
assets reflects the view that deferral and holding of
investment assets is an unnecessary accumulation of the
deferred income, while operating assets represent a
historically justified investment. In the case of a corporate
U.S. shareholder in the foreign corporation, the deduction
amount does not qualify for the indirect foreign tax credit37
or the deduction for the taxes paid outside the U.S.,38 while
the net amount of the inclusion does qualify for the indirect
foreign tax credit or deduction.39
By taxing some or all of the foreign corporation’s pre2018 accumulated foreign source earnings and profits in
2017,40 the transition tax41 facilitates the shift to a

34. I.R.C. § 951(a) (Supp. 2017).
35. I.R.C. § 965(e)(1)(B) (other foreign corporations with a corporate U.S.
shareholder). The deferred foreign earnings attributable to U.S. owners who are
not U.S. shareholders, supra note 11, remain “deferred” and would be taxed to
their U.S. owners when distributed.
36. I.R.C. § 965(c) (an incomplete participation exemption).
37. I.R.C. § 902, repealed by TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
38. I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (Supp. 2017) (forbidding deduction for foreign taxes if
the taxpayer claims a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. § 275(a)(4)).
39. I.R.C. § 965(g) (denial of foreign tax credit).
40. But see I.R.C. § 965(h) (permitting the taxpayer to elect to pay the
transition tax in installments over eight years without interest).
41. I.R.C. § 965.
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participation exemption system42 for distributions from
certain foreign corporations to their domestic corporate U.S.
shareholders. The participation exemption43 introduces
limited territoriality into the U.S. federal income tax system
by eliminating the U.S. tax on dividends from foreign source
earnings of a foreign corporation (other than a PFIC)44 to a
domestic corporation that is a U.S. shareholder of the foreign
corporation. Elimination of U.S. income tax results from a
100 percent deduction for dividends received out of the
foreign source income of the foreign corporation.45 Except to
the extent of the amount included under the transition tax,
no similar prospective deduction is available to noncorporate U.S. shareholders of a CFC, even if they were
subject to the transition tax.46 Insofar as post-2017
distributions of foreign source earnings from the foreign
corporation to its corporate U.S. shareholders will not
become subject to income tax in the U.S.,47 the immediate
inclusion of the accumulated foreign source earnings and
profits in the foreign corporation’s subpart F income in 2017
under the transition tax48 limits the amount of foreign
earnings accumulated before 2018 that will never be taxed
in the U.S. because of the participation exemption. The
transition tax clears away the backlog of potential tax to
make room for a new participation exemption system.

42. I.R.C. § 245A(a) (Supp. 2017) (dividend received deduction for CFC
distributions).
43. I.R.C. § 245A.
44. I.R.C. § 1297 (Supp. 2017).
45. I.R.C. § 245A(a).
46. I.R.C. § 959(a) (Supp. 2017) (exclusion of previously taxed earnings and
profits). Note, however that amounts distributed to non-corporate U.S.
shareholders out of pre-2018 accumulated, foreign source earnings and profits of
the foreign corporation in excess of the amount included to the shareholder under
the transition tax would seem to remain taxable as dividends.
47. I.R.C. § 245A.
48. I.R.C. § 965 (Supp. 2017).
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The participation exemption49 for distributions from
foreign corporations removes the U.S. tax barrier to ongoing
repatriation of income earned through foreign subsidiaries
and simplifies U.S. international taxation by eliminating the
indirect foreign tax credit.50 As it facilitates the change to the
participation exemption, however, the transition tax
requires the immediate inclusion of the accumulated foreign
source earnings and profits of those foreign subsidiaries,
without accompanying distributions,51 in the foreign
corporation’s subpart F income and hence in the incomes of
its U.S. shareholders.52 That inclusion is contrary to judicial
precedent and may be constitutionally infirm.53
A strong constitutional challenge to the transition tax,
however, is unlikely to follow.54 Like an earlier incursion on
the realization requirement in annually marking to market
certain commodities positions,55 the transition tax also offers
a significantly reduced rate of tax56 and interest free

49. I.R.C. § 245A.
50. I.R.C. § 902 (2004) repealed by TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054
(2018).
51. I.R.C. § 965.
52. See supra text accompanying note 29.
53. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding a stock dividend
not to be income under the 16th Amendment). See also Adler & Willis, supra note
18; Mark E. Berg & Fred Feingold, The Deemed Repatriation Tax—A Bridge Too
Far?, 158 TAX NOTES 1345, 1345 (2018) (arguing the tax is a direct tax in violation
of the apportionment clause because it taxes property and not income).
54. But cf. Berg & Feingold, supra note 53, at 1350 (identifying taxpayers who
would have an interest in challenging the application of the statute). See also
Moore v. United States, No. 2:19-CV-01539 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2019) (Westlaw)
(challenging the statute on constitutional grounds).
55. I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (codifying mark to market inclusion in income of
appreciation and depreciation of commodities positions). See also Henry Ordower,
Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and
Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1, 96 (1993) (arguing that market participants
benefit from the exception to the realization requirement because of the 60/40
split of gain into long term and short term without regard to actual holding
period).
56. I.R.C. § 965(c); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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installment reporting57 of the taxable amount to U.S.
shareholders who must include the subpart F income created
by the transition tax. The simultaneous or subsequent actual
repatriation by a distribution from the foreign corporation is
free from further U.S. income taxation even if it precedes the
inclusion in income deferred through installment
reporting.58 Certainly, many U.S. shareholders would have
participated voluntarily and happily in a no-strings-attached
tax reduction for repatriations,59 and will seize the
opportunity to repatriate the earnings of their foreign
subsidiaries at a reduced tax rate.60
III. MACOMBER AND REALIZATION
The Sixteenth Amendment permits federal taxation of
incomes without apportionment among the states.61 Neither
the constitutional amendment nor any taxing statute defines
income and the amendment is silent concerning realization

57. I.R.C. § 965(h)(1) (U.S. shareholders generally); § 965(i)(4) (S corporation
shareholders); supra note 40 and accompanying text.
58. I.R.C. § 959(a) (Supp. 2017) (exclusion of distributions from income if out
of earnings and profits of a foreign corporation previously included under I.R.C.
§ 951(a)).
59. See discussion of the temporary dividends received deduction for
repatriations supra text accompanying note 30. The 2004 tax holiday required
the investment of repatriated funds in the U.S. but the discussion of a further tax
holiday for repatriation continued actively in years preceding the TCJA. See, e.g.,
Chye-Ching Huang, Three Types of “Repatriation Tax” on Overseas Profits:
Understanding the Differences, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL’Y PROCS. (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-10-15tax.pdf (outlining
differences in types of tax holidays).
60. Indications are that the transition tax and its accompanying opportunity
to repatriate triggers stock buybacks rather than increased U.S. investment.
Matt Egan, Tax cut triggers $437 billion explosion of stock buybacks, CNN MONEY
(July 10, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/10/investing/stock-buybacksrecord-tax-cuts/index.html; Alix Langone, Here’s How America’s Biggest
Companies Are Spending Their Trump Tax Cuts (It’s Not on New Jobs), MONEY
(May 17, 2018) http://time.com/money/5267940/companies-spending-trump-taxcuts-stock-buybacks/.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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as a requirement for inclusion of income.62 While the early
tax acts do not define income or realization, the years of
intervening practice and judicial decisions have shed much
light on the concepts of “income” and “amount realized”
under the amendment, but not for the concept of
realization.63 That same statute determines the amount of
gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property
relative to the amount realized.64
Under the governing statute, a taxpayer realizes gain or
loss when the taxpayer sells or otherwise disposes of
property, changing the taxpayer’s relationship to the
property.65 A taxpayer who receives consideration from the
sale or other disposition of property realizes gain equal to the
excess of the amount of consideration received66 over the
taxpayer’s adjusted basis67 in the property, or realizes a loss
if the taxpayer’s adjusted basis exceeds the amount of
consideration received.68 The statute measures the amount
realized as the sum of the money plus the fair market value
of property other than money the taxpayer receives.69 When
there is uncertainty about the value of the taxpayer’s
property but not the value of the consideration received, or
vice versa, the properties or properties plus money paid are
assumed to be equal in value under a doctrine of exchange
equivalency,70 so long as the parties are dealing at arm’s
62. Id. The amendment reads: “The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”
63. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (2012) defines “[t]he amount realized from the sale or
other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair
market value of the property (other than money) received.”
64. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
65. Id.
66. The “amount realized.” I.R.C. § 1001(b).
67. I.R.C. § 1011(a) (2012).
68. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
69. I.R.C. § 1001(b).
70. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184,
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length. If all or part of the consideration is services rendered
to or for the benefit of the seller, the amount realized includes
the value of those services.71
The concept of sale is reasonably straightforward but the
disposition to which the statute refers is less so. In the case
of a sale, the person who relinquishes the property receives
money, other property, services or a combination of types of
consideration. The concept of “other disposition” is vague.72
Abandonment of property is a disposition for zero
consideration and not a sale or exchange unless the property
is encumbered by debt, which the abandoning taxpayer will
not have to repay. Absent a sale, the taxpayer should be able
to deduct the amount of the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the
property if the taxpayer holds the property for investment or
use in the taxpayer’s trade or business.73 If the property is
encumbered, however, the taxpayer is deemed to have sold
the property for the amount of the liability encumbering it
plus any additional consideration and has not abandoned
it.74
Similarly, a gift might seem to be an “other disposition”
with the amount realized being zero but resulting in no
188–89 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
71. Neither the realization statute nor the regulations under the statute
express this concept. However, I.R.C. § 83 requires a service provider to include
in income the fair market value of property he or she receives for services in
income—subject to possible deferral of the inclusion until the property becomes
transferable or ceases to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C.
§ 83(a)(1) (2012). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-6(b) (2017) (interpreting the interplay
between I.R.C. § 83 and I.R.C. § 1001 to treat the service providers’ inclusion in
income as an amount realized for the property).
72. On other dispositions, see Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset
Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86
IND. L.J. 77, 78 (2011) (arguing for giving effect to the “other disposition”
language).
73. I.R.C. § 165 (2012).
74. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (property encumbered with debt
exceeding the fair market value of the property is a sale for the amount of the
debt). See also the statutory codification of the Tufts rule found in I.R.C. § 7701(g)
(2012) (fair market value of property encumbered by non-recourse debt not less
than the amount of the debt).
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taxable loss because the gift is a personal transaction and
neither a trade or business transaction nor a transaction
engaged in for profit and it is not a casualty loss.75 In
addition, gifts burden or benefit the gift recipient with the
donor’s historical adjusted basis76 and preserve pre-gift
appreciation for future inclusion by the donee.77 Charitable
gifts, on the other hand, do generate a deduction for the
donor but not a loss from an “other disposition” for zero
consideration.78 The donor realizes no gain or loss on the
charitable disposition but may be denied a deduction if the
donor received the property in a transaction in which the
donor had no income from the receipt and did not pay for the
donated property.79 Preservation of basis in the hands of the
charitable donee is usually of little or no significance as the
pre-gift appreciation will not produce realized and taxable
gain in the future because the charitable owner of the
property is exempt from taxation.80
“Other disposition” also might refer to encumbrance of
property in exchange for a loan in which the taxpayer
receives consideration and relinquishes a non-possessory

75. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).
76. I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2012). If the fair market value of the property is less than
the donor’s adjusted basis at the time of the gift, for purposes of determining loss,
the donee’s basis is that fair market value, yet the donor does not realize a loss
at the time of the gift disposition.
77. Gifts from decedents differ from gifts from living donors. Decedents’
donees take a new fair market value basis in the property thereby eliminating
historical appreciation as a source of gain without an inclusion in income. I.R.C.
§ 1014(a)(1) (2012).
78. I.R.C. § 170 (2012).
79. Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224, 226–27 (7th Cir. 1975) (denial of
deduction for complimentary text books donated to charity).
80. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012). If a charitable donee ceases to remain exempt from
taxation or later uses the property in an unrelated trade or business and then
sells the property, the sale would be taxable insofar as the sale price exceeds the
donor’s adjusted basis (although the necessary records of basis may be
unavailable). And the charity would adjust the basis, if the property otherwise
were depreciable, on a straight line schedule during the charitable use period.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-4(b) (as amended in 1963).
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interest in the property as security,81 but does not realize
gain because the taxpayer has an obligation to repay the
loan.82 There are transactions in which the taxpayer does not
relinquish the property, but receives consideration for it and
may realize gain.83 For example, a payment of damages is
applied against the owner’s adjusted basis and the amount
in excess of basis is gain realized.84
Realization is usually a precursor to inclusion in income.
Without realization of gain, there is no taxable event and
traditionally nothing to tax. Only if the taxpayer realizes
gain and there is no exception deferring inclusion in
income,85 and there are many exceptions,86 is gain realized
from the sale or exchange87 of property includable in the
income of the owner of the property.88 Conversely, absent a
sale or other disposition, appreciation in the value of
property is not includable in income. Statutory exceptions to
the realization requirement for gain on the appreciation of
property exist and are growing slowly in number. The
exceptions include the periodic inclusion of original issue
discount on debt instruments;89 annual marking to market

81. E.g. a mortgage or Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 security interest.
82. But the owner is deemed to have sold the property for the outstanding
balance of loan, plus any additional consideration if a buyer assumes or takes
subject to the debt, or the owner fails to repay the debt and yields the property to
the lender in lieu of foreclosure.
83. Taxpayers may elect to defer, recognizing the gain with an election. I.R.C.
§ 1033 (2012).
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(c) (2017).
85. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2012).
86. Exceptions include, for example, exchange of property for entity interests
under I.R.C. §§ 351, 721 (2012) and like kind exchanges under I.R.C. § 1031
(2012).
87. I.R.C. § 1001(c). The recognition and inclusion provision in I.R.C. § 1001
introduces the terms “exchange” and “recognize,” but excludes any reference to
“other disposition.”
88. Id.
89. I.R.C. § 1272 (2012) (an embedded contractual increase in value
substituting for current payment of interest on the debt). Original issue discount
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and inclusion in income of unrealized appreciation, or
deduction of unrealized depreciation, of certain commodities,
financial instruments90 and dealer held securities,91
similarly marking to market of the property of individuals
who expatriate at the time of expatriation;92 and most
recently, the transition tax.93
While the realization concept has been critical to
determining the income taxable under the Sixteenth
Amendment,94 realization is not a function of the
amendment. The amendment permitted the taxation of
income without apportionment among the states.95 Neither
the amendment96 nor the taxing statute97 defined income.
The amendment permitted the taxation of income without
apportionment and the statute exercised Congress’s power to
tax income including wages, dividends, and gains derived
from property. Before adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment,
accrual is, arguably, not a realization, but an accounting matter forcing cash
basis taxpayers onto accrual accounting for original issue discount. I.R.C.
§ 267(a)(2) (Supp. 2017) places accrual basis tax transparent entities onto the
cash basis method of their owners who receive otherwise deductible payments
from the entity.
90. I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (annual marking of regulated futures contracts,
foreign currency contracts, nonequity options, dealer equity options, and dealers
securities futures contracts but gain or loss sixty percent long term capital and
forty percent short term capital regardless of actual holding period).
91. I.R.C. § 475 (2012) (security dealers’ inventory marked to market).
92. I.R.C. § 877A (2012) (expatriation tax imposed which also terminates
other deferrals of income and gain).
93. I.R.C. § 965 (Supp. 2017).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Congress had the power to tax income before
the Sixteenth Amendment, but could do so only if the income tax was apportioned
among the states. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1916) (holding
the Revenue Act of 1913, imposing the income tax after the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment to be constitutional without apportionment).
96. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
97. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(A), 38 Stat 114, 166 (exercising Congress’s
new power to tax income without apportionment).
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the taxation of income, including gain from the sale or other
disposition of property, was permissible but impractical
because it could not be apportioned among the states in any
reasonable manner. Thus, direct taxation of income was
impermissible because it was not apportioned and not
because it was unrealized.98
Under various definitions, including the classic HaigSimons definition,99 appreciation in the value of property is
income. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively
rejected that formulation of income in Macomber100 and has
neither reversed nor modified its position on income since
that decision. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.101 is not
to the contrary. Citing Macomber with approval,102
Glenshaw Glass clarifies that income is not only the produce
of labor or capital or both, but may result from other forms
of enrichment, although not from the growth in value of
capital without realization.103
Macomber dealt with the taxability of stock dividends
that the governing statute104 expressly included in gross
income to the extent of their cash value. The Supreme Court
stated that it intended to address the constitutional issue
regarding the stock dividend105 and emphasized that the
taxation of anything other than income remains subject to
the apportionment requirements of the Constitution.106 The
Court held that income includes gain derived and separated

98. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607–08, aff’d on reh’g,
158 U.S. 601 (1895), (holding unapportioned taxes under the Income Tax Act of
1894 unconstitutional because they were not apportioned).
99. SIMONS, supra note 6, at 41.
100. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218-19 (1920).
101. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
102. Id. at 430–31.
103. Id. at 431.
104. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757.
105. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 205.
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
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from capital but not the simple increase in the value of the
capital or gain accruing to the capital.107 Further the Court
observed that the earnings of a corporation are not the
property of the shareholder. The corporation may distribute
its earnings among the shareholders as cash dividends or
liquidating distributions but until distributed the earnings
remain corporate property and not shareholder property.
Stock dividends do not separate property from the
corporation and place it in the hands of the shareholders,108
since the shareholder owns only the same interest in the
corporation as before the dividend and no greater interest in
the corporation’s underlying assets. The separateness of the
corporation from its shareholders is fundamental.109 The
Court stated:
We are clear that not only does a stock dividend really take nothing
from the property of the corporation and add nothing to that of the
shareholder, but that the antecedent accumulation of profits
evidenced thereby, while indicating that the shareholder is the
richer because of an increase of his capital, at the same time shows
he has not realized or received any income in the transaction.110

Further: “enrichment through increase in value of
capital investment is not income in any proper meaning of
the term.”111 And “what is called the stockholder’s share in
the accumulated profits of the company is capital, not
income.”112
The transition tax includes in U.S. shareholders’
incomes the shareholders’ proportional share of a foreign
corporation’s retained profits without any distribution or
107. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207.
108. Id. at 211.
109. Id. at 214. That separation breaks down to some degree in the CFC rules,
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 212. The Court also points out that the shareholder lacks liquidity
to pay the tax following a stock dividend without selling shares and diminishing
her proportional interest in the company. Id. at 213.
111. Id. at 214–15.
112. Id. at 219.
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separation from the corporation’s assets. It is difficult to
imagine facts more closely resembling the issues addressed
and resolved in Macomber. In defining accumulated foreign
earnings as subpart F income, the transition tax includes the
accumulation as income to the corporation’s shareholders
even though, under Macomber, it clearly is not.
IV. CFC AND THE TRANSITION TAX
While there can be little doubt that the transition tax
respects neither the realization nor the income requirement
of Macomber, or Glenshaw Glass for that matter, perhaps the
threshold of realization was crossed long ago with the
enactment of the CFC provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code and later diminished further as a barrier to inclusion
in income by the mark to market rules and the expatriation
tax. Recent scholarship argues that the transition tax is
unconstitutional as a direct tax that must be apportioned.
One argument is that the transition tax simply is not a tax
on income but a tax on property because it reaches events not
in the current tax year.113 Another argument for an
unconstitutional direct tax identifies the income taxed as
excluded rather than deferred income so that retroactive
inclusion of the income becomes a direct tax.114 A third
related argument characterizes the tax as a direct tax on
wealth also subject to apportionment.115
The transition tax enters gross income through the
subpart F door. The longstanding CFC rules116 include

113. Berg & Feingold, supra note 53, at 1358-59 (the authors offer some specific
computations on the effect of the tax and suggest the characteristics of taxpayers
who might challenge the tax and limitations on how they could do so in light of
statute of limitations concerns).
114. Adler & Willis, supra note 18, at 1415.
115. Sean P. McElroy, The Mandatory Repatriation Tax is Unconstitutional,
36 YALE J. REG. BULL. 69, 81 (2018).
116. Subpart F was added to the Code by the Revenue Act of 1962. See
generally Melissa Redmiles & Jason Wenrich, A History of Controlled Foreign
Corporations and the Foreign Tax Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Sept. 13,
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portions of the income of CFCs in the incomes of U.S.
shareholders despite the income being earned, but not
distributed, by the CFC. While the inclusion to the U.S.
shareholders of subpart F income seems a violation of the
Macomber holding, the inclusion does not impute a taxable
dividend, as the possibly unconstitutional foreign personal
holding company provisions did before their repeal,117 nor
would it force a realization of gain as the mark to market
rules do.118 Instead, the CFC inclusion relies more closely on
the assignment of income doctrine for support. 119 Certain
types of CFC income have either i) a minimal or no
connection with the CFC’s jurisdiction and a closer
connection with another jurisdiction;120 or ii) no non-tax,
business reason for placement in the CFC rather than in the
hands of the CFC’s U.S. shareholders.121 Accordingly, from a
business perspective, the link between the subpart F income
and the CFC is tenuous. Since assignment of the income to
the CFC is arbitrary, the CFC provisions simply assign the
income to the taxpayers who control the decision on
placement of the income.122 Were there no CFC provisions,
2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/historycfcftc.pdf (history of the CFC
provisions).
117. I.R.C. § 551 (2000), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-357, § 413(a)(i), 118 Stat. 1418, 1506. See also Ordower, supra note 27,
at 18 (arguing that the foreign personal holding company inclusion probably was
unconstitutional).
118. E.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (commodities futures); I.R.C. § 475 (2012)
(dealer securities), I.R.C. § 877A (2012) (expatriation tax).
119. The principle barring assignment of income in some circumstances
emerges from Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930) (taxing husband on the
share of his income from his personal services that he anticipatorily assigned to
his wife under a binding contract because he, and not his wife, was the one who
produced the income).
120. E.g., I.R.C. § 954(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 2017) (foreign base company sales and
services income).
121. E.g., I.R.C. § 954 (a)(1) (foreign personal holding company income).
122. I.R.C. § 951(b) (Supp. 2017) (defining U.S. shareholders of a CFC). CFCs
are only those foreign corporations in which U.S. shareholders own more than 50
percent voting control and value but the CFC inclusion rules occasionally may
include some U.S. shareholders who have no control, even as part of a control
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the IRS might use the more general income allocation rule to
achieve the same end for the subpart F income.123
This assignment of income analysis of the CFC rules is
imperfect. Under the CFC regime, it is possible that the
CFC’s subpart F income will be subject to the income tax in
another taxing jurisdiction such as the CFC’s country of
residence, while under general assignment of income
principles, the income would be attributed to the correct
taxpayer and away from the taxpayer to which it in fact was
assigned.124 That limitation on the analysis seems less
problematic when compared with the transfer pricing
instances in which income is properly attributed to a
taxpayer different from the taxpayer reporting the income,
but the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer reported the
income does not relinquish its claim to tax the income so that
more than one taxing jurisdiction taxes the income.125
A second limitation on the analysis is the character of
the income. Unlike expressly tax transparent entities,126 the
CFC provisions do not preserve character. Instead, the CFC
inclusion transforms all subpart F income into ordinary
income of an unspecified character.127 For purposes of the
foreign tax credit however, a “look-thru (sic)” rule applies128
group, over the activities of the CFC.
123. I.R.C. § 482 (Supp. 2017).
124. Id. (as applied to the statute’s primary use, transfer pricing). See also
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1–9 (2017).
125. For example, absent an advance pricing agreement or the concurrence of
the competent authorities from both or multiple jurisdictions, a U.S. taxpayer
may be allocated income from a transaction that another country also taxes.
126. E.g., I.R.C. § 702(b) (Supp. 2017) (partnerships); I.R.C. § 1366(b) (Supp.
2017) (S corporations); I.R.C. § 852 (Supp. 2017) (regulated investment
companies distributing their income and separating and preserving the character
of ordinary income, long term capital gain and exempt interest as the income
passes through to shareholders as dividends); I.R.C. § 1293 (Supp. 2017)
(qualified electing funds under the PFIC regime separating ordinary income from
net capital gain as it passes through to shareholders).
127. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (inclusion of pro rata share of subpart F income).
128. I.R.C. § 904(d)(3) (Supp. 2017).
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and characterizes the portion of the CFC inclusion
attributable to passive category income of a CFC as passive
category income to the U.S. shareholder.129 Unclear is
whether subpart F income attributable to the active conduct
of the CFC’s trade or business would be passive activity
income in the hands of its U.S. shareholders for purposes of
the passive activity loss limitations.130 In addition to
character change for some income, the inclusion of subpart F
income is limited to the CFC’s current earnings and profits—
a dividend concept and limitation. Non-subpart F losses of a
CFC may diminish the current earnings and profits and
prevent the inclusion of some or all of the subpart F income
in the income of the U.S. shareholders.131 Application of
assignment of income principles to shift income produces a
less favorable outcome for the U.S. shareholders because
assignment of income is specific to the gross shifted income.
It would include shifted income in the U.S. shareholders’
incomes but would not permit the non-subpart F losses of the
CFC to reduce the net amount shifted.
Even if the assignment of income doctrine helps the CFC
inclusion to reconcile, albeit less than comfortably, with
Macomber’s characterization of stock dividends as not being
income because they alter nothing in the relationship
between the corporation and its shareholders and do not
generate realized and includable gain, the assignment of
income doctrine does not help with the transition tax. The
transition tax does not redirect foreign earnings of a foreign
corporation to its U.S. shareholders as the earnings accrue.
Rather, the transition tax redefines accumulated foreign
source earnings and profits of a foreign corporation as
subpart F income in 2017. Macomber expressly rejected
taxing accumulated earnings and profits to a corporation’s
shareholders in the absence of a distribution. Such

129. I.R.C. § 904(d)(3)(B).
130. I.R.C. § 469 (Supp. 2017).
131. I.R.C. § 952(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2017).
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accumulated earnings and profits are not income but are
part of the capital ownership that corporate shareholdings
constitute. The transition tax does not alter the foreign
corporation’s ownership of any of its property acquired with
its earnings nor does it alter the U.S. shareholders’
relationship to that property. Inclusion in the U.S.
shareholders’ incomes may encourage the corporation to
distribute the accumulated earnings to its U.S. shareholders
or cause the shareholders to demand distributions, but the
income tax cannot compel those distributions nor has it ever
before sought to do so.
Use of the CFC provisions does not change the taxation
of accumulated earnings and profits into current corporate
earnings or shareholder income so long as the Supreme
Court has not overruled its Macomber precedent. The
transition tax, despite its use of the CFC mechanism, taxes
U.S. shareholders on their capital ownership of foreign
corporations. In so doing, it joins the ranks of previously
enacted mark to market inclusion provisions132 limiting the
constitutional realization principle as underpinning income
inclusion under the Sixteenth Amendment.
V. ABANDONING REALIZATION
With the transition tax, Congress selectively abandoned
the realization requirement and partially cleared the
accumulation of foreign earnings that were a possible barrier
to a systemic change in the tax law, that is, the new
participation exemption.133 While the transition tax limits
tax planning opportunities for a specific class of taxpayers, it
leaves intact opportunities for other taxpayers to plan their
tax deferrals and avoidances that rely on the realization
principle. An investor in real estate, for example, may claim
depreciation allowances134 while operating real estate that
132. E.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2012); I.R.C. § 475 (2012); I.R.C. § 877A (2012).
133. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 245A).
134. I.R.C. § 167 (Supp. 2017) (depreciation generally); I.R.C. § 168 (Supp.
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does not in fact depreciate in value and yet not be taxed on
the gain in the value of the property as it appreciates in the
market or as the investor rolls it over into other real estate
without recognizing the gain realized in the exchange.135
Ultimately the increase in value may escape taxation
permanently when the investor dies and the beneficiaries of
the investor’s estate sell the property free from any taxable
gain because the property takes on a new, fair market value
basis at the investor/owner’s death.136
Legislating reduced rates of tax, as it did with a previous
selective abandonment of the realization principle,137
Congress bought the cooperation of many of those taxpayers
the legislation affects adversely. On this occasion, in addition
to a reduced rate of tax, the possibly illusory elimination of
tax on future offshore earnings accompanied the reduced
rate of tax.138
This selective legislation traverses ground similar to
that of the expatriation tax as well. With the transition tax,
Congress chose a single moment on which to impose a tax on
a limited group of taxpayers who earned no income and
engaged in no otherwise taxable transaction. As the
expatriation tax isolates an expatriating taxpayer from all
other taxpayers, marks that taxpayer’s assets to market and
includes the cumulative increase in value at the moment of
expatriation even though the taxpayer changes no
2017) (accelerated cost recovery as the depreciation allowance).
135. I.R.C. § 1031 (2012) (permitting the deferral of realized gain in a like-kind
exchange of real property).
136. I.R.C. § 1014 (2012) (basis of property received from a decedent’s estate
by reason of the decedent’s death).
137. I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (characterizing sixty percent of the gain, without
regard to holding period, as reduced rate long term capital gain).
138. The combined impact of the new provisions governing global intangible
low-taxed income, I.R.C. § 951A (Supp. 2017) [hereinafter GILTI], foreign derived
intangible income, I.R.C. § 250 (Supp. 2017) [hereinafter FDII], and the base
erosion anti-abuse tax, I.R.C. § 59A (Supp. 2017) [hereinafter BEAT], undercut
the benefit of the expanded dividend received deduction for foreign source income
under I.R.C. § 245A (Supp. 2017).
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relationship between any asset and herself, the transition
tax includes the accumulated foreign earnings of a
corporation in the incomes of its shareholders on a
statutorily fixed date. Like the tax on long term capital gains,
both the expatriation tax and the transition tax are
cumulative rather than periodic taxes. Both the expatriation
tax and the transition tax reach an accumulated amount of
appreciation in property that may have accrued over a
lengthy period but was not yet taxable under general tax
rules. Both provisions tax cumulative appreciation at a
single moment as the inclusion of realized and recognized
long term capital gain taxes economic income accumulated
over an extended period at the moment of the sale or
exchange of the appreciated property. Neither the taxation
of long term capital gain nor the expatriation tax is
retroactive as they tax accumulated gain. The transition
tax’s subpart F mechanism could be viewed as retroactive in
that it redefines a foreign corporation’s income as subpart F
income even though when that income was earned it became
classified correctly as not subpart F income.139 Yet, in its
resemblance to mark to market inclusion, the transition tax
is taxing accumulated but previously untaxed appreciation
in value. The transition tax could have used a mark to
market mechanism for taxing all the accumulated foreign
income, but avoided double taxation arguments and
uncertainties by focusing instead on accumulated foreign
earnings and profits not previously included in subpart F
income.
The practical outcome of both the expatriation and
transition tax statutes is substantially the same as both will
fail to reach all income that they might or should have
captured. The expatriation tax will miss taxing the full value
of many expatriating taxpayers’ assets as those taxpayers
exploit discounting techniques developed in the estate

139. Adler & Willis, supra note 18, at 1423 (arguing the income was excluded,
not deferred, income).
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planning industry to minimize the mark to market
inclusion.140 Similarly, the transition tax will miss much
unrealized appreciation in the assets of CFCs and other
specified foreign corporations because the measure of the
foreign corporation’s earnings and profits does not include
that unrealized appreciation and, when realized, that income
may remain free from U.S. tax because of the extended
dividends received deduction.141 Both taxes disregard the
Macomber precedent and tax the unrealized appreciation in
the taxpayer’s assets. The expatriation tax views
expatriation, a change in the taxpayer’s status, as a taxable
event.142 The transition tax goes a further step from
realization as it taxes at a moment when neither the
taxpayer’s relationship to the property nor the taxpayer’s
status changes but there is a change in tax law.
If constitutionally permissible under the Sixteenth
Amendment, enactment of the transition tax reflects
Congress’s power to abandon the realization requirement
and impose a tax on accumulated but deferred economic
income. At Congress’s whim, further targeted limitations on
140. Stephen J. Leacock, Lack of Marketability and Minority Discounts in
Valuing Close Corporation Stock: Elusiveness and Judicial Synchrony in Pursuit
of Equitable Consensus, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 683, 686 (2016). On the use
by the Trump family of sophisticated discounting techniques, see David
Barstow, Susanne Craig & Russ Buettner, Trump Engaged in Suspect Tax
Schemes as He Reaped Riches From His Father, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/02/us/politics/donald-trump-taxschemes-fred-trump.html?searchResultPosition=9.
141. I.R.C. § 245A (referring to the participation exemption, i.e., the one
hundred percent dividends received deduction for distributions from the foreign
source earnings of a CFC). Congress appears not to have considered unrealized
appreciation and its potential for increasing earnings and profits when it imposed
the transition tax even though such unrealized appreciation affects other areas
of tax law. For example, it is a factor in measuring whether or not an
accumulation of earnings is beyond the reasonable needs of the business for
purposes of the accumulated earnings tax. See I.R.C. § 532 (Supp. 2017)
(accumulation of earnings beyond reasonable needs determinative of purpose to
avoid shareholder level tax); I.R.C. § 531 (Supp. 2017) (accumulated earnings tax
imposed).
142. For example, a taxpayer who is expatriating changes her status from U.S.
person to non-U.S. person.
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realization may take effect and create sub-groups of
taxpayers who will capture a significant benefit or suffer a
substantial detriment from the changes without outright
abandonment of the historical realization-based income
inclusion structure. Realization survives as the precursor to
inclusion of gain on property but no longer limits the taxing
power of Congress.143
In its current, newly limited form, the realization
requirement will continue to serve the propertied segments
of American society,144 even though abandonment of
realization would offer the opportunity to reexamine and
separate those instances in which realization supports a
significant tax policy purpose from those in which it no
longer does or never did have a sound policy foundation.
Unless abandoned, the realization requirement will continue
to facilitate the accumulation of wealth by postponing,
frequently forever, the contribution of any part of the growth
in value of a taxpayer’s property to public needs.145 In

143. The TCJA also expressly undercuts the principle of horizontal equity that
like taxpayers be taxed alike, as it separates the class of wage earners from the
class of independent contractors. See I.R.C. § 199A (Supp. 2017) (allowing a
twenty percent deduction for income derived from an unincorporated trade or
business excluding the trade or business of an employee). Unlike realization with
its constitutional underpinning in Macomber, horizontal equity in taxation is not
a constitutional requirement in the United States unless a statute discriminates
against a constitutionally protected group, so imposing a higher rate of tax on a
specific group would be impermissible if embedded in the statutory language but
would not be unconstitutional if the statute were facially neutral but had a
disparate impact on a specific group. See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States
Contrasted, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 259, 290–96 (2006). For example, I.R.C. § 199A may
have such a disparate impact if a specific group has disproportional numbers of
employees relative to sole proprietors. Germany, on the other hand, has express
constitutional jurisprudence requiring horizontal equity in taxation. Id. at 301–
26.
144. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
145. The wealthiest taxpayers may continue to be subject to an estate tax at
death but most taxpayers will remain free from the estate tax at its current $11.4
million (or $22.8 million for married individuals combining their exemptions)
inflation-adjusted exclusion. I.R.C. § 2010 (2012) (unified credit deduction
equivalent). See also Rev. Proc. 2019-57 (showing most recent inflation
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addition, selective abandonments of realization introduce
uncertainty for taxpayers and encourage them to devote
resources unnecessarily to tax planning to develop
contingent tax plans.146 A stable, predictable set of rules on
which to rely would be more efficient economically than the
current state of uncertainty.
A comprehensive tax base model would include annually
in each taxpayer’s income “the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question.”147 Currently, the realization
requirement defers the inclusion in income of the increase in
the value of the taxpayer’s store of property rights until the
taxpayer sells or exchanges those rights for money or other
property,148 or even longer if one of the gain recognition
deferral provisions applies.149 Realization following the
series of incursions on its territory is no longer an immutable
requirement, if it ever was,150 but has been a matter of
administrative convenience subject to limitation and
alteration by Congress as most or all other tax rules.151
adjustments).
146. Professor Dr. Drüen comments on the inefficiency of tax planning: “ . . .
Steuerumgehung volkswirtschaftlich betrachtet . . . führt zur ineffizienten
Allokation von Ressourcen, weil beträchtliches Personal in Unternehmen,
Steuerberatung und Staat fern von wirtschaftlicher Nutzenmaximierung
gebunden wird.” (citations omitted) (“from an economic perspective, tax
avoidance . . . leads to inefficient allocation of resources as considerable
personnel in business, tax planning industries, and the state remain far from
economic production maximization activity.”) (author’s translation). Drüen,
Unternehmerfreiheit und Steuerumgehung, StuW 2008, 154 (158).
147. SIMONS, supra note 6, at 50.
148. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2012).
149. I.R.C. § 1001(c). See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (Supp. 2017) (referring to like kind
exchange of real property).
150. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (mark to market for commodities futures);
I.R.C. § 877A(a)(1) (2012) (expatriation tax).
151. Compare the assignment of income and tax benefit principles. Most
academic commentators agree that, despite Macomber, realization is not a
constitutional requirement. See Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV.
779, 782–85 (1941) (emphasizing administrative convenience). The literature
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Congress could and should require all taxpayers to measure
and include in income annually the increase in the value of
their respective stores of property rights. Although taxpayers
might object to the change in law on a variety of policy
grounds, an argument based on longstanding tradition or
some vague vested right in continuing the law without
change should fall flat following enactment of the transition
tax that eliminated the longstanding (and vested) tradition
of offshore deferral of business income. While there are policy
arguments in favor of continuing a realization-based system,
there are powerful arguments for elimination of realization.
A great deal of tax simplification would accompany
elimination of the realization requirement but elimination
also would introduce new, but limited, complexity in
valuation and collection. Hope for elimination of realization
is certainly an unlikely and utopian dream, but with
incursions past the realization barrier, a look at the
advantages of eliminating the realization requirement
recommends itself.
Annual marking to market of all property for all
taxpayers would add to the complexity of determining value
for property for which there is no public trading market and
cause some, possibly many, taxpayers to have to sell property
to meet their tax obligations. In instances in which the sale
of illiquid property becomes necessary, compulsion to pay
might be ameliorated by deferred payment opportunities,152
and, in limited instances, a diminished rate of tax.153
Increases in value of illiquid property are likely to be gradual
favoring a shift away from realization-based taxation is extensive. See, e.g.,
Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based
Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 503 (2004); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without
Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1114–16
(1986); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and
Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1820 (1990).
152. Cf. I.R.C. § 877A(b) (2012) (expatriation tax payment deferral).
153. Cf. I.R.C. § 965(c) (Supp. 2017) (deduction for transition tax); I.R.C.
§ 1(h)(1), (11) (2012) (referring to reduced rate on net capital gain and qualified
dividends).
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most of the time, and the possible decreases in tax rate
accompanying a broader comprehensive tax base will
prevent many taxpayers from suffering from the increased
taxable income attributable to inclusion of appreciation in
the value of their assets. The following paragraphs identify
some tax simplifications and economic efficiencies that an
accrual or accretion tax operating by a mark to market
mechanism might generate.154
A. Economic Income Taxed
Professor Blum correctly pointed out that any argument
that capital gains are not income is conclusory and not an
argument at all.155 Arguments that a tax on capital gain is a
tax on capital, rather than income, fail for much the same
reason as the argument that capital gains are not income.156
The Haig-Simons comprehensive income formula includes
increase in value of capital as income.157 Although
accounting conventions tend to eschew annual revaluation of
assets because gain from revaluation may distort the
measurement of profit and operating success,158 there are
major segments of the national economy in which periodic
revaluation is commonplace and essential to conduct of the
effected business. For example, public and private
investment funds, real estate investment trusts and pension
funds must revalue their assets at frequent intervals to
facilitate ongoing investment and withdrawal as well as the
payment of management fees. Such investment funds play
an ever greater role as the point of assembly of capital as
direct individual investment in equities shifts to such

154. This portion of the article relies in part on Professor Walter J. Blum’s
classic article: A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments. Blum, supra
note 8.
155. Id. at 248.
156. Id.
157. SIMONS, supra note 6, at 50.
158. Blum, supra note 8, at 249.
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indirect ownership through pooled investment vehicles.159
Even in operating, as opposed to investment industries, asset
revaluation becomes critical to facilitate acquisitions and
financings and occasionally to support an extraordinary
dividend when earned surplus is insufficient.
The current failure to tax all economic income distorts
the distribution of tax burdens. Taxpayers whose income is
from their labor are taxed annually on all the income their
labor produces,160 while those with property find that the
periodic yield from the property that is subject to tax often is
accompanied by growth in value of the property which is not
taxed until sold. Taxing economic income would level the tax
burden between labor and property ownership. In recent
years, the U.S. trend and the trend in most highly developed
economies has been the opposite, favoring income from
capital. Taxes on income from property have retreated and
taxes on labor have increased or remained unchanged.161 As
such, a shift to an increased tax on income from property may
prove elusive. Nevertheless, the broadened tax base from
159. Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, Innovation and
Institutional Ownership 103 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 302 (2013); Charles McGrath,
80% of equity market cap held by institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 25, 2017,
1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/1704299
26/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions.
160. To a limited extent, taxpayers may divert a portion of their income from
labor to tax deferred retirement savings and some non-taxable benefits if they
are fortunate enough to have sufficient disposable income to defer and
employment providing a structure for the non-taxable benefits. See I.R.C.
§ 402(a) (Supp. 2017) (deferring inclusion to an employee until distribution from
the qualified retirement plan). See also I.R.C. § 125(a) (2012) (providing an
exclusion from gross income for contributions to a cafeteria plan).
161. In the U.S., for example, the TCJA reduced the rate of tax on corporate
income to twenty-one percent, I.R.C. § 11(b) (Supp. 2017), and introduced a
deduction for income from primarily capital-intensive unincorporated businesses
of twenty percent. I.R.C. § 199A(a) (Supp. 2017). In 2003, the rate of tax on
dividends declined to the rate imposed on net capital gain. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)
(2000) amended by Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-27, § 302(a), 117 Stat. 752, 760. In Scandinavia, a change to a dual
income tax that imposed more favorable rates on capital than on labor began to
manifest itself in 1987 in Denmark. Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual
Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 NW. J.L & SOC. POL. 41, 42 (2010).
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taxing economic income would produce more government
revenue at current rates, which if unneeded, could be
deployed to reduce rates of tax for all taxpayers.
B. Lock-in
With increase in value includable annually, tax burdens
no longer would distort economically desirable choices to sell
or convert property to match its highest and best use.162 As
gain or loss becomes includable annually, the taxpayer would
adjust the basis of property to reflect that income
inclusion.163 Whenever the highest and best use of property
changes, taxpayers could redeploy their property from
unproductive to productive uses and claim depreciation
allowances from an adjusted basis closer to current fair
market value than under the current realization based
system. Similarly, bunching of long-deferred gain into the
year of sale no longer would deter taxpayers from selling
property. Taxpayers would measure gain in the year of sale
from a gradually increasing adjusted basis reflecting the
annual inclusions of advances in value in their property. Sale
in many instances would generate only a small, one-year
gain even though proceeds of sale might be significant. If the
taxpayers had been paying their tax on increases in value
annually rather than deferring payment, most of their
proceeds would be available for reinvestment. Existing
statutes designed to overcome lock-in concerns like the like
kind exchange provision for real property164 would become
obsolete—a tax simplification.
162. Rate fluctuations on capital gains have exacerbated the lock in problem.
David Kamin & Jason Oh, The Effects of Capital Gains Rate Uncertainty on
Realization 21 (Oct. 27, 2018) (unpublished draft) (available at https://
www.ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads/proceedings/2017/NTA2017-310.pdf).
163. Cf. I.R.C. § 1016(a) (2012) (adjustments to basis).
164. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (Supp. 2017) (deferral of realized gain on a like kind
exchange of real property). Before 2018, the like kind exchange provision also
applied to personal property used in a trade or business or held for investment.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC LAW 115–97
184 (2018).
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C. Giving
Death would cease to be the ultimate tax shelter because
adjustment in basis to fair market value basis at death would
become unnecessary.165 Lifetime gifts with respect to which
the donee must assume the donor’s historical basis under
current law166 and gifts at death yielding a new basis to the
donee167 would become identical for tax purposes so that gift
giving decisions would be fully independent of most tax
considerations.168 The current lifetime gift basis rule is
designed to neither encourage nor discourage gift giving.
Taxing the donor on appreciation at the moment of the gift
under current law might discourage gift giving as donors
may be reluctant to pay a tax currently. Preserving the
donor’s basis in the hands of the donee169 prevents the
historical appreciation from escaping taxation when the
donee disposes of the property.170 But the gift basis provision
encourages donors to delay their gifts until death so that the
recipient will not become taxable on the gain accruing during
the donor’s period of ownership of the property that is the
subject of the gift. With annual taxation of appreciation,
donees always would receive property with a new, fair

165. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2012) (basis of property received from a decedent
is the fair market value of the property at the date of death or, if applicable, the
alternate valuation date). The tax community has recognized that the new basis
at death rule is unfair and inefficient, yet the effort to repeal that rule was a
failure and has not garnered new support despite severe limitation on imposition
of the estate tax.
166. See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2012) (donee takes donor’s basis except fair market
value at the date of the gift for purposes of computing a loss if the donor’s basis
in the property exceeded the property’s fair market value on the date of the gift).
167. I.R.C. § 1014(a).
168. Transfer of income producing property to lower marginal bracket
taxpayers would continue to be advantageous but many of the most likely gift
recipients, the donor’s children, would be subject to the “kiddie tax” at the donor’s
marginal rate. See I.R.C. § 1(g) (2012).
169. I.R.C. § 1015(a).
170. See Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 482 (1929) (holding that the recipient of
a gift can be taxed on appreciation in value during the donor’s holding period).
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market value basis; a substantial simplification of the tax
rules. Appreciation or depreciation in value from the end of
the previous taxable year to the date of the gift would be
taxable to the donor.
D. Charitable Giving
The quirky and flawed policy of permitting property to
yield a fair market value charitable contribution deduction
without inclusion of gain to the donor would disappear, as
would much of the complexity in reporting the value of
charitable gifts. The current system of charitable
contribution deductions subsidizes charities with tax
revenue by permitting certain donors to redirect a portion of
their income tax liability to the charitable donee.171
Redirection occurs because the deduction diminishes the
donor’s income tax liability by removing an amount equal to
the deduction from the donor’s taxable income. The
deduction is available only to taxpayers who itemize their
deductions,172 a small percentage of the taxpaying public

171. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2012) (allowing a deduction for charitable
contributions of money and property). See also Daniel Halperin, A Charitable
Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-in Gain, 56 TAX
L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). Whether any tax subsidy through charitable giving is
justifiable and desirable seems a settled question and beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless, the existence of the subsidy assumes that efficiency
demands the subsidy because i) charities deliver necessary services more
efficiently than the government does; ii) charities deliver necessary services the
government will not or cannot deliver; or iii) because of the subsidy, charities
capture additional funds that the government could not and apply them to
delivery of necessary services.
172. See I.R.C. § 62 (2012) (adjusted gross income does not include the
charitable contribution deduction as an adjustment); I.R.C. § 63(a) (2012 & Supp.
2017) (taxable income is adjusted gross income less either (i) the I.R.C. § 199A
deduction and the standard deduction defined in I.R.C. § 63(c) or (ii) gross income
less all deductions including the charitable contribution deduction). Only
taxpayers who have itemized deductions including the charitable contribution
deduction exceeding in the aggregate the standard deduction will derive a tax
benefit from the charitable contribution deduction. Non-itemizing taxpayers can
achieve the same or even better benefit than itemizing taxpayers from a
charitable contribution if they contribute their services to charity, rather than
cash or property, because the value of the contributed services will be excluded
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populated primarily by high-income taxpayers.173
In the case of a contribution of property, the measure of
the deduction in most instances is the fair market value of
the property on the date of the gift. Exceptions limiting the
deduction amount to the donor’s basis in the property apply
to property which would not yield long term capital gain if
sold by the donor174 and tangible personal property not
related in service and use to the donee’s charitable
purpose.175 The donor realizes no gain when contributing
even substantially appreciated property to a charitable
donee. With such donations, the tax subsidy is not only the
amount of tax on the contribution amount but also the
amount of tax that otherwise would have been imposed on
the long-term capital gain when recognized. The effect is the
equivalent to the new basis at death for non-charitable
donees of appreciated assets from a decedent’s estate while
the donor is still alive. If the gain were taxed on contribution,
the donor might not make the gift, instead holding the
property until the step-up in basis at the donor’s death.176
Annual marking to market eliminates both the excess
subsidy built into the current contribution deduction that
currently is a function of not taxing the gain at the time of
contribution and the donor’s incentive to hold the property

from their gross incomes thus redirecting the tax on their services to the charity.
Henry Ordower, Charitable Contributions of Services: Charitable Gift Planning
for Non-Itemizers, 67 TAX LAW. 517, 517–19 (2014).
173. TAX POLICY CENTER, BRIEFING BOOK, 141 (2019) (ebook) https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-itemized-deductions-and-whoclaims-them.
174. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (limiting deduction to basis if gain not long-term
capital).
175. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (limiting deduction for tangible personal
property).
176. See Halperin, supra note 171, at 16–19 (arguing that gain forgiveness
incentivizes charitable contributions when the donor otherwise would hold the
property until death). Halperin is not persuaded that the incentive is efficient.
Id. at 35.
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until death to get the new basis.177 It is possible that some
potential donors may shy away from charitable giving
without the excess subsidy but the policy decision to ignore
that concern seems already to have been made. Congress
reduced the number of itemizers who make charitable
contributions only because they are deductible when it
enacted the TCJA in 2017 by increasing the standard
deduction178 and encouraged cash rather than property
donations by large donors with an increase in the charitable
deduction limit to $60,000 for cash contributions only.179
Marking to market also should diminish the number of
overvaluations of charitable contributions, as any excess
value will attract a tax on the gain to the donor in the year
of the gift. If there continues to be a rate differential with the
charitable contribution drawing an ordinary deduction while
the gain is taxed at a lower rate imposed on net capital gain,
the incentive, albeit diminished, for charitable giving of
appreciated property and overvaluing that property will
remain.180 But mark to market is likely to diminish the need
for supporting appraisals for non-cash charitable
contributions181 and exposure to overvaluation penalties,182
except in limited circumstances.
E. Inflation Adjustment to Basis
A longstanding argument against taxing capital gain is
that capital gain is not a real gain but rather a reflection of

177. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
178. I.R.C. § 63(c)(7)(A) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (increasing standard deduction
temporarily).
179. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(G)(i) (Supp. 2017) (increasing contribution base for cash
charitable contributions temporarily).
180. And in those instances where taxpayers donate non-appreciating personal
use property in which their basis exceeds the value, there also will remain an
incentive to overvalue.
181. I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(C) (appraisal requirements for contributions in excess
of $5,000).
182. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(3) (2012).

2019] TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE

1407

inflation. While Professor Blum refuted the argument
extensively dismissing it as absurd,183 the argument
endures. In recent years, the argument has manifested itself
as individuals proposed adjusting the basis of capital assets
for inflation,184 adding to the many inflation adjustments
that already have found their way into the Internal Revenue
Code, further adding to its complexity.185 Marking to market
undercuts any remaining arguments concerning inflation as
only annual, as opposed to long term, inflation would be of
significance. Annual inflation impacts all sources of income.
The purchasing power of wages declines with inflation so
wage increases are just as artificial as gain on property to
the extent of inflation. Inflation impact on wages is
ameliorated to a very limited extent by the inflation
adjustment to rate brackets.186 That adjustment should
suffice for property value inflation, or a modification of the
brackets for income from marking to market if those brackets
differ from ordinary income marginal rate brackets.
If appreciation and depreciation are included in the
annual tax base, tax law will become a great deal simpler
than it is now.187 Features of the tax law such as depreciation

183. Blum, supra note 9, at 255–56.
184. Kyle Pomerleau, The Economic and Budgetary Impact of Indexing Capital
Gains to Inflation, TAX FOUNDATION, Sept. 2018, at 1–8, https://files.
taxfoundation.org/20180910132823/Tax-Foundation-FF610.pdf. Cf. Daren
Fonda, Indexing Capital Gains to Inflation Would Be Great for the Rich. There’s
No Economic Rationale., BARRON’S (Aug. 3, 2019 8:00 AM), https://www.barrons
.com/articles/indexing-capital-gains-to-inflation-makes-no-economic-sense51564833600.
185. The IRS annually publishes the inflation adjustments in a revenue
procedure. Rev. Proc. 2019-57 (showing most recent inflation adjustments).
186. I.R.C. § 1(f)(3) (2012) (cost of living adjustments) (modified and limited by
I.R.C. § 1(j) (Supp. 2017)).
187. Sixty years ago, Walter J. Blum argued that capital gains as a principal
source of complexity in tax law that was a sufficient reason for eliminating its
preferred treatment. Blum, supra note 9, at 266. None of the provisions for
depreciation recapture, qualified dividends, or qualified business income, infra
notes 188–190, were in place when Blum made that observation.
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recapture,188 the reduced rate of tax on qualified corporate
dividends,189 and the new twenty percent qualified business
income deduction190 have diminished the frequency with
which taxpayers seek to convert ordinary income into capital
gain. At the same time all those provisions have added to the
complexity of the tax law. Similarly, limiting exploitation of
opportunities to convert ordinary income from services into
long-term capital gain through “carried interests” has proven
to be particularly troubling for tax policymakers.191 The
carried interest conundrum demonstrates that the timing
and rate differentials between sales of property yielding
long-term capital gain and ordinary, currently taxable
income from business operation and performance of services
have a great deal of continuing significance. The timing and
rate differentials are a source of considerable complexity in
tax law. With annual inclusion, taxpayers would have
weaker, if any, incentives for seeking to convert ordinary
income into long-term capital gain. Except for the limitation
of the Medicare tax to income from services,192 a limitation
mostly eliminated by the tax on net investment income,193
annual marking to market would simplify an unnecessarily
and enormously complex and often manipulated tax law.
Nevertheless, the details of transitioning to and
188. I.R.C. § 1245 (2012) (depreciation recapture on personal property).
189. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (qualified dividends taxes at net capital gain rate).
190. I.R.C. § 199A (Supp. 2017) (qualified business income deduction).
191. I.R.C. § 1061 (Supp. 2017) (extending holding period requirement for
capital gain on carried interest added by TCJA). On carried interest, see generally
Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund
Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071,
1073 (2008); Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008). For an earlier discussion of
the profits interest conundrum, see Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to
Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 TAX LAW. 19, 19–41 (1992).
192. E.g., I.R.C. § 3101(b) (2012) (hospital insurance tax on wages); I.R.C.
§ 1401(b) (2012) (hospital insurance portion of the self-employment tax).
193. I.R.C. § 1411(c) (2012) (tax on certain net investment income). The failed
attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act in 2017 permitted I.R.C. § 1411 to
survive since it was a primary funding mechanism for the Affordable Care Act.
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implementing a general mark to market system for taxing
gain and loss are daunting.
VI. CONCLUSION
The transition tax and the expatriation tax dispel any
lingering doubts about the power of Congress to tax
unrealized gains and losses at a moment Congress selects.
Both the transition tax and the expatriation tax choose a
single moment at which to tax gains and losses that have
accumulated over long time periods. The transition tax
reaches accumulations of corporate earnings after 1986194
while the expatriation tax could reach much further back
through generations of accumulated gains and losses195 as it
forces expatriating taxpayers to mark all their property to
market on the day before their expatriation.196 While the
expatriation tax selects a taxation date related to the event
of expatriation which otherwise might remove some property
permanently from U.S. taxing jurisdiction,197 the transition
tax chooses a date to facilitate an alteration in U.S. tax law
without any event occurring specific to the taxpayer or the
property taxed.
Insofar as imposing tax on value, which has increased
over extended periods, is permissible under both the
transition tax and the expatriation tax without any
realization event. Congress equally might choose a date on
which to require all U.S. taxpayers to mark all their property
to market and include in income the gain or loss on the

194. I.R.C. § 965(d) (Supp. 2017) (deferred foreign income accumulated after
1986).
195. An expatriating taxpayer who received property from a donor during the
donor’s lifetime would have the donor’s adjusted basis in the property under
I.R.C. § 1015 and if the donor also received the property as a gift, the donor might
have her donor’s adjusted basis reaching back several generations.
196. I.R.C. § 877A(a) (2012) (requiring all property to be treated as sold at fair
market value the day before expatriation).
197. I.R.C. § 865 (2012) (sourcing gain from sale of personal property at the
taxpayer’s residence, for example).
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property as if it were sold at fair market value on the date
selected to facilitate the transition to an annual mark to
market tax system. Following the initial bulk marking to
market and inclusion, taxpayers would mark their assets to
market annually and again when they dispose of an asset.
Dispositions by sale would yield gain or loss measured by the
sale price less the adjusted basis as that basis has been
adjusted to reflect previous markings to market. A
disposition other than a sale would be equated with a sale at
fair market value.
Determination of fair market value might be
troublesome for some property. The tax law, however,
generally rejects claims that value is indeterminate.198
General asset value reporting is certainly not
unprecedented. Reporting is required under the estate tax at
each decedent’s date of death.199 While the estate tax now
reaches only estates in excess of 11.4 million dollars, for
much of estate tax history, the requirement to determine the
value of all a decedent’s property at date of death affected a
broader segment of the taxpayer population than it now does.
Moreover, even taxpayers who receive property from an
estate not subject to the estate tax have an incentive to
determine the value of property received to reset the
adjusted basis of the property to fair market value at date of
death.200
Market quotations are available for a great deal of
investment property—securities and currencies, for
example—which is actively traded on a public market.
Interests in closely held businesses are more difficult to

198. “The fair market value of property is a question of fact, but only in rare
and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market
value.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (amended 2017).
199. I.R.C. § 2001 (2012) (imposing estate tax).
200. I.R.C. § 1014 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-47) (explaining new basis
in property received from a decedent). Annual marking to market would
eliminate any lingering arguments for a new basis at death. See supra note 167
and accompanying text.
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value but some shorthand method for the initial valuation—
such as capitalization of operating revenue or income—might
suffice to support the systemic transition to mark to market.
Over time, annual increments in value will become
increasingly accurate as a national value database develops.
Much or most U.S. real property already is subject to periodic
revaluation under state and local law for determination of ad
valorum property taxes. Although the locally determined
values do not utilize a uniform methodology across taxing
jurisdictions and are quite possibly imperfect, they can serve
the development of the national database of values. The
national database would benefit local tax collectors as its
accuracy improves. Other valuable property such as artwork,
coins, memorabilia, and even gemstones initially will be
subject to imperfect determinations of value but the
imperfections will become less pronounced over time as the
national value database develops.
Real property located outside the U.S. and other nonU.S. property for which there is no U.S. market may prove
difficult to value so that imposition of the initial tax in rare
instances may have to await the conversion of the property
into cash or other property. A look-back rule like that for
PFICs201 which averages the gain when included over the
taxpayer’s holding period of the property accompanied by an
interest charge may induce taxpayers to be forthcoming in
their valuations and seek to determine value.
To a limited extent, Congress can give taxpayers an
incentive to identify value initially as accurately as possible
through a rate system that favors the initial inclusion of
unrealized gain. As Congress did with the transition tax,202
a significant rate reduction for the initial gain inclusion
would serve that purpose accompanying a higher rate for
annual inclusions of mark to market gain. The initial tax

201. I.R.C. § 1291 (2012) (inclusion of PFIC assigns gain on sale ratably to each
day in the taxpayer’s holding period).
202. I.R.C. § 965(c)(2) (Supp. 2017) (applying reduced rate of tax).
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might distinguish traded from non-traded property and favor
non-market traded assets that are more difficult to value.203
An opportunity to pay the tax at transition to the mark to
market system in installments would ease the burden of the
one-time tax.204
Marking to market will be burdensome to some, perhaps
many, taxpayers. Where an active and open trading market
exists for the taxpayer’s property, payment of the initial tax
should prove uncomplicated. Since the gain will be taxed
with or without a sale, sale of some holdings to pay the tax
both initially and annually seems unproblematic. Taxpayers
will remain reluctant to pay a lump sum tax but payment is,
perhaps primarily, a psychological or emotional hurdle.
Taxpayers who receive sizeable salary bonuses or severance
payments generally have no opportunity to avoid or postpone
the tax on those payments even though the tax leaves them
with diminished resources. A mark to market tax paid with
the proceeds from the sale of liquid assets is no more
burdensome.
Personal residences present a more serious difficulty in
a mark to market system. Taxing the annual increase in the
value of a personal residence in most instances differs little
from the annual imposition of a property tax by the local
taxing jurisdiction. Often in the context of a political anti-tax
campaign, proponents of limitations on property taxes
describe homeowners forced out of their homes when they
are unable to pay their property taxes. Some jurisdictions
offer relief to older citizens whose means of support is social
security payments and pension plans described as fixed
income individuals. Except in a market with steep
appreciation in real property value because a specific
neighborhood is gentrifying or a new and desirable resource
has become available in the neighborhood, increases in value

203. Id. (lower rate by way of a larger deduction for operating, rather than
liquid investment assets).
204. I.R.C. § 965(h) (regarding installment payment of the transition tax).
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are likely to be moderate and the tax on them small. If
exemptions for certain classes of homeowners become
necessary to protect taxpayers from losing their homes,
postponement of tax payment with low or no interest may be
the simplest solution.
Similarly, other illiquid assets, especially those of
personal or sentimental value in addition to market value,
may require some accommodation. For illiquid assets
generally deferral of the tax payment beyond the installment
reporting may be essential to prevent distress sales of assets
to pay the tax. Deferred payment should draw an interest
charge except items of personal or sentimental value. In the
case of personal or sentimental property, deferred payment
of the tax without interest as the property passes within the
extended family might be a reasonable accommodation, but
a value limitation simultaneously might be in order. In the
absence of an estate tax on most estates, imposition of an
income tax on appreciation in the value even of personal or
sentimental property would not seem an outrageous
demand. For lower income and wealth individuals, an
exemption from the tax in the form of a separate zero rate
tax bracket also might recommend itself. Although a
separate zero bracket might make sense for the initial tax on
transition to mark to market, creation of more permanent
differential or schedular rates is troubling. Schedular rates
discriminate in favor of taxpayers with some appreciating
property relative to taxpayers with income only from the
performance of services. Distinctions among types of income
violate principles of horizontal equity.205
Liquidity, especially to pay a concentrated tax at the
transition to mark to market, remains a matter of concern.
The concern, however, may be no greater with a mark to
market system than under a realization-based system. If the
realization event is accompanied by the receipt of money,

205. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the deduction for
qualified business income with respect to horizontal equity under I.R.C. § 199A).
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realization increases the likelihood that the taxpayer will
have the money with which to pay the tax. Often, however,
even cash transactions do not yield sufficient proceeds to
enable a seller to pay the tax on the seller’s gain if the
property sold is encumbered by debt that the seller must
repay. When a taxpayer exchanges property for property, the
taxpayer frequently remains illiquid and unable to pay a tax
on the gain. Under a realization system with opportunities
to defer recognition and inclusion in income,206 the lack of
liquidity is unproblematic. Yet, Congress newly limited the
general recognition deferral rule for like-kind exchanges to
real property indicating that Congress did not view the need
for general deferral as compelling. Annual marking to
market will diminish further or eliminate the need for
deferral provisions, as unrealized gain at any point is likely
to be small.
The TCJA offers a rare opportunity to reexamine
systemic characteristics of the U.S. income tax system as the
TCJA rejects realization and undercuts the principle of
horizontal equity. Although the act seems to favor taxpayers
with high income and wealth,207 it removes historical fetters
that may have prevented Congress from reconsidering
fundamental and longstanding tax policies hampering
enactment of changes in law to distribute tax burdens
differently from custom. Timing of the inclusion of gain in
income and the capital gain rate preference are functions of
longstanding policies that have begun to become obsolete or
are not yet obsolete but are obsolescing. Historically,
unrealized gain may have been difficult to measure
accurately, but current data analytics have progressed and

206. I.R.C. § 1031 (2012) (like-kind exchanges of real property); I.R.C. § 721
(2012) (exchanges of property for a partnership interest); I.R.C. § 351 (2012)
(exchange of property for corporate shares).
207. See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, The TCJA Shifted The Benefits Of Tax
Expenditures to Higher-Income Households, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/tcja-shifted-benefits-tax-expenditureshigher-income-households.
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large data base management renders valuation considerably
more certain than it was, especially as the database matures.
Among the strongest and most enduring arguments for a
long-term capital gain rate preference is the concentration of
the gain into a single tax period.208 Except for the year of
transition to a general mark to market system when this
Article proposes a reduced rate and possibly installment
payment following the model of the transition tax,
concentration is not an issue and that justification for a
reduced rate falls by the wayside.

208. Blum, supra note 8, at 253.

